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Abstract
This paper investigates whether environmental or energy-efficiency regulations induce 
innovations in relevant technologies through focusing on the tightening of Japanese fuel 
economy regulations in the 1990s and the early 2000s. Unlike previous studies that analyze 
patent data, I use vehicle-level specification data for 1985–2004 to estimate whether regu-
latory pressure accelerated technological progress in fuel efficiency. I compare Japanese 
automakers with selected American and European automakers in a difference-in-differ-
ences framework. The estimation results provide strong evidence for induced technologi-
cal change: conditional on other vehicle attributes and the production cost, the regulatory 
tightening induced at least a 3–5% improvement in the average Japanese vehicle’s fuel 
economy relative to a counterfactual case with no regulatory change, an effect which would 
have taken at least 4–7 years to be realized with no pressure from fuel economy regulations 
or fuel prices.
Keywords Vehicles · Fuel economy regulations · Induced innovation · Technological 
change
JEL Classification L62 · O30 · Q48 · Q55 · Q58
1 Introduction
Understanding how government policies, including environmental and energy-efficiency 
regulations, affect innovations in “clean” technologies is crucial to sustaining economic 
growth without causing serious environmental degradation (Acemoglu et  al. 2012). The 
induced innovation hypothesis, first specified by Hicks (1932) and more recently restated 
in relation to environmental policy by Porter (1991), suggests that environmental regula-
tions, along with resource prices, can be a source of technological change. According to the 
hypothesis, to comply with environmental or energy-efficiency standards, firms will allo-
cate more resources into developing relevant technologies and/or lowering the production 
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costs of these technologies. This leads to advances in environmental or energy-efficient 
technologies (“induced” or “directed” technological change) and lowers the compliance 
costs.
This paper empirically tests the hypothesis in the context of road transport, one of the 
biggest sources of greenhouse gas emissions that makes up 10% of global emissions in 
2010 and 23% of US emissions in 2016, for example (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change 2014; Environmental Protection Agency 2018). Specifically, I estimate how Japa-
nese automakers’ production possibility frontier (PPF) between fuel economy and other 
relevant attributes (e.g., horsepower) improved from the mid-1980s to the early 2000s. 
Japanese fuel economy regulations started to be tightened in the 1990s, preceding the tight-
ening or introduction of similar regulations in other regions, including the US and the EU. 
Using vehicle characteristics data (rather than patent data as in almost all the previous stud-
ies on induced innovation in environmental or energy-efficient technologies), I investigate 
whether the technological progress achieved by Japanese automakers accelerated after the 
regulatory tightening.
Previous studies show empirical evidence of technological change induced by environ-
mental/energy-efficiency regulations or energy/fuel prices.1 Newell et  al. (1999) analyze 
technological change in energy efficiency based on product-level data for air condition-
ers and water heaters in the US market, finding that the direction of technological change 
is responsive to energy prices for some products and that government energy efficiency 
standards also have a significant impact on the average energy efficiency of the product 
menu. Based on US patent data, Popp (2002) studies the impact of energy prices on inno-
vations in energy-saving technologies, noting a strong, positive impact of energy prices on 
the number of new patents. Similarly, Popp (2006) uses patent data from the US, Japan, 
and Germany to examine the innovation in and diffusion of air pollution control equip-
ment, observing that innovation responds to regulatory pressure. There are other studies in 
the literature, such as Lanjouw and Mody (1996), Jaffe and Palmer (1997), Brunnermeier 
and Cohen (2003), Nesta et al. (2014), and Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2016), that also use 
patent data to estimate the degree of induced innovation.
Given the economic and environmental significance of the auto industry, several studies 
look particularly into (induced or overall) technological change in vehicle fuel economy 
or emission control technologies. Berry et al. (1996) estimate automakers’ production cost 
functions for the period 1972–1982, when gasoline prices increased rapidly and vehicle 
emission and fuel economy standards were tightened. Using plant-level cost data, they 
show that (per-vehicle) production costs increased over the period, even after controlling 
for changes in vehicle characteristics. Additionally, by analyzing patent data, they observe 
that patent applications linked to combustion engines increased significantly, implying 
faster technological progress. An important implication of the results of Berry et al. (1996) 
is that rising gasoline prices or tightened regulations lead simultaneously to increased pro-
duction costs and technological progress, both of which can improve fuel economy. Knittel 
(2011) examines fuel economy trends in the US, using vehicle-level specification data and 
an empirical framework which is similar to this paper’s in that fuel economy is regressed 
on other vehicle attributes and firm and time fixed effects. He focuses on the overall rate of 
technological progress (part of which may be induced by government regulations and fuel 
1 Recent surveys of the theoretical or empirical literature on induced innovation include Jaffe et al. (2003), 
Vollebergh (2007), Popp et al. (2010), Carraro et al. (2010), Ambec et al. (2013) and Dechezleprêtre and 
Sato (2017).
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prices) and finds steady trends of fuel economy improvement (conditional on other vehicle 
attributes and firm fixed effects) in the US between 1980 and 2006. According to his esti-
mates, the early 1980s, when gasoline prices were high and the US Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy (CAFE) standards were tightened, saw the fastest pace of improvement, which 
likely resulted not only from (autonomous and induced) technological progress but also 
from the increased production costs associated with fuel economy, as suggested by Berry 
et  al. (1996).2 He also states that his estimates may be biased because these incremen-
tal production costs are unobservable and thus omitted.3 Haščič et al. (2009) use interna-
tional data on patent activity to show that environmental regulations and higher fuel prices 
encourage innovations in automotive emission control technologies for local air pollutants. 
Based on US patent data on energy-efficient automotive technology, Crabb and Johnson 
(2010) measure technological progress induced by high oil prices and the CAFE standards, 
finding robust empirical evidence for the impact of oil prices, but none for the CAFE stand-
ards. By analyzing firm-level patent data from multiple countries, Aghion et  al. (2016) 
observe that “clean” innovations in the auto industry (for example, innovations associated 
with electric, hybrid, and hydrogen vehicles) are stimulated by high fuel prices.
These previous studies on induced innovation in energy efficiency or pollution control 
are based on patent data (except for Newell et  al. (1999) on air conditioners and water 
heaters), whereas I examine induced innovation by using product characteristics (vehicle 
specifications) data. In this regard, this paper is similar to Newell et al. (1999) and Knittel 
(2011) discussed above. While patents are an essential part of innovation, energy efficiency 
patents themselves do not reduce energy consumption or carbon emissions; they must be 
adopted in marketed products to achieve this goal (technology adoption and commerciali-
zation). It is, therefore, worthwhile to measure the extent of induced technological change 
that materializes in marketed products. I intend to fill the gap in the literature between 
induced innovation as measured by patent counts, which has been empirically confirmed by 
many studies, and improved environmental performance or energy efficiency as observed 
in actual product characteristics.
An issue in estimating induced technological change using product characteristics data 
is how to distinguish it from the effect of increased production costs. The findings by Berry 
et al. (1996), as described above, suggest that both technological progress and increased 
production costs presumably helped improve fuel economy after the tightening of the Japa-
nese regulations. However, it is practically impossible to observe how much is spent on 
various fuel economy-improving systems and devices of each vehicle (hence the omission 
of the costs by Knittel (2011)).
2 Autonomous technological progress is what occurs irrespective of market conditions such as fuel prices 
or environmental regulations.
3 Knittel (2011) interprets the estimated trend of fuel economy improvement as the effect of technological 
progress despite the possible bias due to the omission of the production costs related to fuel economy. For 
robustness checks, he estimates several regressions, each of which includes an additional explanatory varia-
ble related with a vehicle’s price as a proxy for the production costs devoted to its fuel economy, and argues 
that the bias is likely small. Nevertheless, the negative coefficient estimates for the vehicle price variables in 
these regressions imply that more expensive vehicles are less fuel efficient conditional on other explanatory 
variables. This makes it unclear if these vehicle price variables are good proxies for the fuel economy costs: 
other things equal, additional production costs spent for a vehicle’s fuel economy should make it more fuel 
efficient. Since the production costs related to fuel economy ( C1 in his theoretical model) are just part of 
the total production costs of a vehicle ( C1 + C2 in his theoretical model), it may be the case that the vehicle 
price is a good proxy for C1 + C2 , but not for C1 , the part that needs to be controlled for in estimating tech-
nological progress in fuel efficiency.
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This paper intends to address the problem by analyzing vehicles produced by Japanese 
automakers and sold in the US, with vehicles produced by selected American and Euro-
pean automakers and sold in the US serving as a control group. There are a few key obser-
vations for this research design. First, these non-Japanese automakers’ sales in the Japanese 
market were so small that the Japanese fuel economy regulations were unlikely to affect 
their technology. That is, only Japanese automakers potentially experienced innovations 
induced by the Japanese regulations. Second, the Japanese regulations were the main fac-
tor in inducing technological progress in fuel efficiency during the period of the analysis 
(1985–2004). Fuel economy regulations in the US and the EU remained almost unchanged 
or had not come into effect in this period. Fuel prices were relatively stable or slowly 
decreasing in most countries, including Japan, the US, and the EU. This implies that, other 
than the Japanese regulations, there were few, if any, factors that would have induced tech-
nological progress in fuel efficiency in these markets during the period. Third, the paper’s 
regression analysis indicates that Japanese vehicles sold in the US market were not subject 
to the added production costs resulting from the Japanese regulations. Then, the regulation-
induced innovation, which presumably benefited the production of these vehicles too, can 
be observed in them without being confounded by the induced extra costs.
Under these circumstances, the paper’s empirical strategy, which compares the US-mar-
ket fleet of Japanese automakers (the treatment group) with that of selected American and 
European automakers (the control group) in a difference-in-differences framework, reveals 
(a lower bound of) the effect of technological progress induced by the Japanese regulations. 
This is because (1) comparing the two groups in a difference-in-differences framework will 
“difference out” the trends that are common to both groups, such as autonomous techno-
logical change, and (2) the effects specific to Japanese vehicles in the treatment period are 
attributable to the technological progress (rather than the incremental production costs) 
induced by the Japanese regulations. In practice, the effect of induced innovation estimated 
from this framework should be interpreted as a lower bound of the actual effect for a few 
reasons that are discussed in Sect. 4, such as the possibility that an induced shift of a Japa-
nese automaker’s PPF might not fully transfer to the production process of its US-market 
fleet. This empirical strategy is similar to the one taken by Popp (2006) and Aghion et al. 
(2016) in the sense that induced innovation is identified by exploiting international differ-
ences in environmental regulations or fuel prices and the variation across firms in the rela-
tive importance of different national markets in their sales.
Using the US Environmental Protection Agency’s fuel economy test data for each vehi-
cle configuration sold in the US from the 1980s to the 2000s, I estimate how the fuel econ-
omy of the vehicles in the treatment and control groups improved over time, conditional 
on other attributes such as horsepower and engine size. The analysis reveals whether the 
Japanese automakers’ rate of improvement in (conditional) fuel economy accelerated rela-
tive to that of the non-Japanese automakers once the tightened regulations in Japan started 
to affect the former (but not the latter) in the second half of the 1990s.
The estimation results provide evidence of substantial induced technological progress. 
Across different settings, the estimated lower bounds for the effect of induced innovation 
are generally in the range of 3–5% (with significance at the 5% or 10% level in most cases). 
That is, induced technological change enabled the average vehicle to be at least 3–5% more 
fuel efficient, holding other vehicle attributes and the production cost constant and set-
ting aside the autonomous factors (e.g. autonomous technological change) that would have 
occurred even in a counterfactual case of no regulatory change. Stated differently, the effect 
of induced innovation is at least as large as what would have resulted from such autono-
mous factors over 4–7 years even with no inducement from fuel economy regulations or 
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fuel prices. Thus, this paper illustrates that new patents induced by government regula-
tions, which are analyzed and evidenced by the previous studies, are indeed adopted in 
actual products sold in the market and contribute to significant improvements in environ-
mental performance or energy efficiency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical framework 
to analyze the determinants of automotive fuel economy. Section 3 describes fuel economy 
regulations and trends in Japan. Section 4 explains the data used for the empirical analy-
sis and discusses the empirical framework. Section 5 presents the estimation results, and 
Sect. 6 concludes the study.
2  A Model of Induced Technological Change in Fuel Economy
Let us consider the following model of an automaker’s production cost function for the fuel 
economy of a vehicle:
where m and t index a manufacturer and time, respectively; e is the vehicle’s fuel economy 
(miles per gallon, or mpg); 퐱 is a vector of other vehicle attributes (e.g., horsepower and 
engine displacement) that affect fuel economy and are valued by consumers due to their 
preferences for non-fuel-economy aspects of a vehicle; and c is the minimum cost of pro-
ducing a vehicle with (퐱, e) , as derived from the manufacturer’s cost minimization. This 
function corresponds to the function C1 of Knittel (2011).
Given 퐱 , improving e requires more or better fuel economy-improving systems/devices, 
which increase the fuel economy cost, c (i.e., 𝜕Fm
t
(퐱, e)∕𝜕e > 0).4 For example, a vehicle 
with a six-speed transmission would be more fuel efficient than a vehicle with the same 
characteristics except for having a five-speed transmission, but increasing the number of 
gears from five to six would incur additional costs.
Assuming Eq. (1) is solvable for e, the paper will focus on the following function:
The function Gm
t
 (or equivalently Fm
t
 ) represents the level of automaker m’s fuel efficiency 
technology at time t and is the primary focus of the paper. The function describes how fuel 
efficiency (e) relates to the vehicle characteristics that affect e, such as vehicle weight and 
horsepower, and fuel economy-improving systems/devices as summarized in c.5 In other 
words, Gm
t
 represents automaker m’s PPF between e and 퐱 , given c. In this framework, 
technological change is equivalent to a shift of Gm
t
 over time as in Fig. 1, which shows the 
(1)c = Fmt (퐱, e),
(2)e = Gmt (퐱, c).
4 Specifically, National Research Council (2002) lists three categories of fuel economy improving devices/
systems. The first category improves the energy efficiency of engines by reducing friction and other 
mechanical losses or by improving the processing and combustion of fuel and air (e.g., variable valve tim-
ing, cylinder deactivation, and direct injection engines). The second category improves the efficiency of the 
transmission system where power is transmitted from the engine to the drive shaft or axle (e.g., six-speed 
automatic transmissions and continuously variable transmissions). The third category relates to other ways 
of improving fuel economy such as aerodynamic drag reduction, rolling resistance reduction and integrated 
starter/generator systems. The Council also includes novel vehicle concepts such as hybrid electric vehicles 
in the third category.
5 The theoretical background for including the production cost (c) in the technology function can be found 
in, for example, Alexander and Mitchell (1985), Triplett (1985) and Newell (1997).
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trade-off between e and x1 conditional on the other attributes in 퐱 and c. The induced inno-
vation literature considers two sources of technological change (e.g., Newell et al. 1999): 
one is autonomous technological change that would occur regardless of market conditions, 
and the other is induced technological change that results from changes in market condi-
tions such as regulations and resource prices. Therefore, induced technological change is 
regarded as a faster shift of Gm
t
 when government regulations are tightened or fuel prices 
go up.
This model indicates three determinants of a vehicle’s fuel economy: other vehicle 
attributes that affect fuel economy ( 퐱 ), the costs spent on “producing” its fuel economy 
(c), and the level of the producer’s fuel efficiency technology (the function G, where super/
subscripts are omitted for brevity). The observed fuel economy is the combined outcome of 
these factors. It is important to distinguish the first two factors from the last: a change in e 
( Δe ) due to a change in 퐱 or c ( Δ퐱 or Δc ) is a shift along the PPF, while Δe due to a change 
in G ( ΔG ) is a shift of the PPF.
Fuel economy regulations and fuel prices are two important conditions that lead 
automakers to adjust e by changing 퐱 , c, and G. Facing new fuel economy regulations or 
stronger consumer demand for fuel economy because of increased fuel prices, they improve 
fuel economy by adjusting 퐱 or c or by advancing G. Reducing vehicle weight or engine 
size/power is the easiest way to improve fuel economy, although it may not be welcomed 
by consumers. Indeed, the introduction of the US CAFE standards in 1978 brought a sig-
nificant reduction in vehicle weight and power (Environmental Protection Agency 2019). 
In addition, new government regulations or high fuel prices are likely to increase the fuel 
economy cost (c). For example, the fuel economy regulations established by the Obama 
administration in 2009 were expected to increase the cost of the average car by $1300. Sim-
ilarly, Berry et al. (1996) estimate automakers’ production cost functions for 1972–1982 
and find that the tightened emission standards and increasing gasoline prices added to vehi-
cle production costs. Third, as suggested by the induced innovation hypothesis, regulatory 
Fig. 1  Technological progress as an outward shift of the production possibility frontier
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pressure or strong demand for better fuel economy may induce more R&D activities in 
fuel efficiency and shift G outwards. To empirically investigate the effect of fuel economy 
regulations on technological change, we need to separate these three effects and extract the 
information on the shift of G alone. This would be relatively straightforward if vehicle-
level, repeated cross-section data are available for e, 퐱 , and c over time. In this case, the 
shift of G can be estimated by regressing e on 퐱 and c along with time trend variables.
An empirical challenge is that c is unobservable. It is practically impossible to know 
how much is spent on each vehicle’s fuel economy. If we omit c and just regress e on 퐱 and 
time trend variables for a period when c is systematically changing over time, we cannot 
distinguish the effect of ΔG from that of Δc . Therefore, we cannot conclude whether the 
observed fuel economy improvements (after controlling for Δ퐱 ) are due to technological 
progress or production cost changes. For a period of regulatory tightening, ignoring c is 
likely to overestimate technological progress if automakers also increase c over time to 
meet the targets. This paper addresses the issue by examining Japanese vehicles sold in 
the US market, which the analysis in Sect. 4 indicates are not subject to the cost increases 
induced by the Japanese regulations.
3  Fuel Economy Regulations and Trend in Japan
Figure 2 summarizes the Japanese fuel economy targets for the years 2000 and 2010. The 
targets vary by vehicle weight class, and an automaker’s average fuel economy for each 
weight class in (and after) an implementation year (2000 or 2010) must exceed the corre-
sponding target value. A weight class is represented by a flat section of each step function 
in Fig. 2. The year 2000 targets were established in January 1993, aiming to improve the 
fleet-average fuel economy by 8.5% in 2000 relative to 1990. The year 2010 targets were 
set in March 1999 to improve the fleet-average fuel economy by 23% in 2010 relative to 
1995.
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For the period 1991–2007, Fig.  3 plots the average (annual) rate of fuel economy 
improvement over the seven weight classes for which the 2000 and 2010 regulations were 
binding.6 The figure shows that much faster improvement occurred after the late 1990s 
than before. Given that gasoline prices in Japan slowly declined in the 1990s (Fig. 4), the 
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Fig. 3  Fuel economy improvement in Japan (1991–2007). Note: For each year, the figure shows the aver-
age (annual) rate of fuel economy improvement over the seven weight classes for which the 2000 and 2010 
standards were binding
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6 The values in the figure are calculated from the fuel economy data published by the Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure and Transport.
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new fuel economy standards are most likely the primary factor to explain the fuel economy 
trend. Even though the targets did not come into force until 2000, fuel economy began 
to pick up in advance (instead of having a large jump in 2000). This is because of vehi-
cle model cycles: typically, the fuel economy of a vehicle model is significantly improved 
when it is fully redesigned (usually every 4–6 years), and this timing differs across models.
Although Fig. 3 indicates the effect of the fuel economy regulations, it may not be fully 
explained by induced technological progress. As discussed above, when regulations are 
tightened, fuel economy improvements may come from three factors: reducing 퐱 , increas-
ing c, and advancing G. Since Fig. 3 is based on the average rate of fuel economy improve-
ment over different vehicle weight classes and vehicle weight is a crucial element of 퐱 , the 
effect of Δ퐱 over time is controlled for (at least partially). Nevertheless, the improvement 
rate in Fig. 3 contains the effects of both ΔG and Δc . Therefore, it is uncertain from the 
figure alone how much of the improvement can be attributed to technological change ( ΔG).
4  Empirical Framework
The overall empirical framework of this paper is to estimate the induced technological 
change due to the Japanese fuel economy standards by analyzing vehicles that were pro-
duced by Japanese automakers (specifically, Honda, Isuzu, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, 
Subaru, Suzuki, and Toyota) and sold in the US. These standards may have induced both 
an upward shift of G and increases in c for these producers’ Japanese-market fleet, making 
it hard to identify the effect of the former. The regression analysis below indicates that their 
US-market models, on the other hand, were not subject to Δc that was induced by the Japa-
nese regulations. Thus, Japanese vehicles in the US market help us identify (a lower bound 
of) the effect of induced technological progress. The following subsections discuss more 
details of the empirical framework.
4.1  Data
I use vehicle specification data taken from the US Environmental Protection Agency’s 
annual “Fuel Economy Test Car List Data” for model years (MYs) 1985–2004 (1985–2009 
for some regressions). This dataset contains the results of all the fuel economy tests con-
ducted under the CAFE standards, providing the information on fuel economy and other 
relevant attributes for almost all the vehicle configurations sold in the US new light-duty 
vehicle market each year. Note that a vehicle model (e.g., the Toyota Camry) in a given 
year usually has a number of configurations which vary in weight, engine size, transmis-
sion type, and so on. The dataset typically includes multiple configurations per model. In 
the following analysis, I focus on gasoline-engine vehicles and thus exclude hybrid, elec-
tric, and diesel vehicles because their market shares were very small during the period of 
my analysis (1985–2004). Lastly, a particular vehicle configuration usually remains on the 
market for several years (i.e., there are no changes in its specifications for several years), 
thus appearing in the dataset over multiple years. To highlight the latest PPF, I use only 
the first observation for each vehicle configuration and drop the observations in subsequent 
years.
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4.2  Estimation Strategy
Simply put, my estimation strategy is a difference-in-differences framework in which 
I compare the Japanese automakers with selected American and European automakers 
before and after the Japanese fuel economy regulations started to affect the former (but 
not the latter). Overall, this is similar to the strategy used by Popp (2006) and Aghion et al. 
(2016). These papers note international differences in environmental regulations or fuel 
prices and the heterogeneity across manufacturers (of air pollution control equipment for 
Popp (2006) and of vehicles for Aghion et al. (2016)) in the relative importance of differ-
ent geographic markets in their sales. Under these circumstances, firms face different levels 
of regulatory pressure and the papers exploit this variation to identify induced innovation.
Specifically, my strategy can be summarized by the following two-way fixed effects model:
where the subscripts imt represent vehicle configuration i produced by manufacturer m in 
year t, and eimt is fuel economy (miles per gallon). On the right-hand side, Jmt is a dummy 
variable for vehicles produced by the Japanese automakers in year t, and 퐱imt is a vector of 
other attributes that affect fuel economy and are valued by consumers due to their prefer-
ences for non-fuel-economy aspects of the vehicle. More specifically, 퐱imt consists of the 
natural logarithms of weight (kg), horsepower (hp), and engine displacement (liter) as well 
as the squared and interaction terms of the three logarithms (i.e., the translog form), and 
dummy variables for transmission types, drivetrain types, and the light-duty truck category.7
Also included are manufacturer and year fixed effects ( 훿m and 휂t ). Thus, 훼t measures 
the average difference in fuel efficiency between the Japanese and non-Japanese vehicles 
in year t, conditional on other vehicle attributes and manufacturer and year fixed effects. 
The effect of ΔG or Δc over time is reflected in the time trend of 휂t to the extent that it 
is common to all vehicles/automakers (e.g., autonomous technological change), and in 
the time trend of 훼t to the extent that it is specific to the Japanese vehicles/automakers 
only. By plotting 훼t over time, I investigate whether 훼t shifts upward for the period during 
which the tightened Japanese regulations influenced the Japanese automakers. While this 
upward shift may capture the combined effect of ΔG and Δc due to the regulations, it is a 
lower bound of the effect of ΔG as long as the Japanese regulations did not systematically 
increase the fuel economy cost (c) of the Japanese vehicles in the dataset (i.e., those sold in 
the US market), conditional on 퐱imt , 훿m , and 휂t.8 The regression results in Sect. 4.4 indicate 
that this condition is likely to hold for them.
(3)ln eimt = 훼tJmt + 휸�퐱imt + 훿m + 휂t + 휀imt,
7 Transmission types are automatic (AT), semi-automatic (SAT), and manual (MT). Drivetrain types are 
front wheel drive (FWD), rear wheel drive (RWD), and all/four wheel drive (AWD/4WD).
8 To be more precise, suppose that the true model is
where 𝜃 > 0 (the term 휃cimt may be replaced with a more general function g(cimt) with dg(cimt)∕dcimt > 0 ). 
Then, 훼t captures technological progress specific only to Japanese firms. Because cimt is unobserv-
able, I instead estimate Eq.  (3) by OLS with cimt omitted and denote the estimate of 훼t of Eq.  (3) by ?̂?t . 
Then plim ?̂?t = 𝛼t + 𝜃𝜆t , where 휆t is the coefficient of Jmt in the regression of cimt on Jmt , 퐱imt , and 
manufacturer and year fixed effects (see, e.g., Cameron and Trivedi 2005,  p. 93). Therefore, unless 
휆t also shifts upward in the period of the higher regulatory pressure in Japan, the upward shift of ?̂?t 
(more precisely, plim ?̂?t ) during the period is a lower bound of the upward shift of 훼t . As an illus-
tration, consider two periods with and without regulatory pressure ( t = 1 and 0, respectively), then 
plim(?̂?1 − ?̂?0) = 𝛼1 − 𝛼0 + 𝜃(𝜆1 − 𝜆0) ≤ 𝛼1 − 𝛼0 if 휆1 ≤ 휆0.
(4)ln eimt = 훼tJmt + 휸�퐱imt + 휃cimt + 훿m + 휂t + 휀imt ,
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As discussed above regarding Fig. 3, vehicle model cycles caused the effect of induced 
technological change to be observed in the second half of the 1990s, prior to the enforce-
ment of the year 2000 Japanese regulations, making it difficult to clearly determine the 
“before” and “after” periods. Nevertheless, because the year 2000 targets were announced 
in January 1993, it is reasonable to assume that the MYs 1985–1993 vehicles were not 
affected by the regulations (the MY 1993 fleet in the US generally came onto the market in 
late 1992, prior to the announcement). Thus, in what follows, I will set the pre-treatment 
period to MYs 1985–1993, which provides a reference point for measuring the impact of 
the regulations.
The following subsections consider three key issues relating to this strategy. Suppose we 
observe an upward shift of 훼t in the data during a period of regulatory pressure. Section 4.3 
argues that the tightening of the Japanese regulations is the main cause of such a shift 
between the mid-1990s and the early 2000s. Section 4.4 examines whether the observed 
shift results from technological progress ( ΔG ), rather than the added production cost ( Δc ). 
Section 4.5 explains which non-Japanese manufacturers are included in the control group 
to be compared with their Japanese counterparts.
4.3  Are the Japanese Regulations the Main Factor?
After the mid-2000s, oil prices (and motor fuel prices) soared and fuel economy regula-
tions were introduced or tightened in many countries. If a study focuses on this period, it is 
difficult to identify whether the observed induced technological change, if any, is due to the 
increased fuel prices or the tightened/introduced regulations in a particular country.
In contrast, from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s, the period of my analysis, the 
Japanese fuel economy regulations were very likely the predominant factor in inducing 
innovations in fuel efficiency. Fuel economy regulations in other countries and world oil 
prices remained stable in this period. Presented below are observations from three major 
vehicle markets at that time (Japan, the US, and the EU), which turn out to be the homes 
of the automakers included in my analysis. Figures 4 and 5 show gasoline prices in Japan 
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and the US, the two most important markets for the Japanese automakers, where they sell 
4.2 million and 2.6 million vehicles, respectively, in 2002, for example. Gasoline prices 
slowly decreased or remained stable from the mid-1980s until around 2004, implying 
that consumer demand for fuel economy was also stable in comparison to the period 
after the mid-2000s. Fuel prices in the EU, another major vehicle market, show similar 
trends. It is unlikely that fuel prices in this period induced innovations in fuel efficiency 
technologies.
Moreover, fuel economy regulations were not tightened in the US and the EU during 
this period. The US CAFE standards remained very stable from the mid-1980s until 2005, 
when the target mpg for light-duty trucks started to gradually increase (Fig. 6). In the EU, 
the first fuel economy regulations were adopted only in 2009 to come into effect in 2015, 
although there were voluntary agreements between carmakers and the European Commis-
sion (e.g., the ACEA agreement) that set voluntary targets for 2008 or 2009 (which were 
not met). It is again unlikely that these markets provided non-negligible regulatory pressure 
for innovation in vehicle fuel economy before the mid-2000s. These trends in fuel prices 
and fuel economy regulations suggest that if the Japanese automakers experienced induced 
technological change between the mid-1990s and the early 2000s, the main driver was the 
tightening of the Japanese fuel economy regulations during the period.
4.4  Japanese Vehicles in the US Market
If a shift of the PPF ( ΔG ) is induced by the regulations, a rational automaker would have 
an incentive to produce all vehicles on the PPF, no matter where they are sold. Then, the 
effect of the induced shift is also observed in the Japanese automakers’ US-market fleet. 
In reality, the transfer of the effect to their US-market fleet may not be prompt or complete 
even within a single manufacturer. In this sense, the magnitude of induced technological 
progress estimated with the US market data shall be considered a lower bound of the actual 
effect.
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As for the fuel economy cost (c), the Japanese regulations may have increased or 
decreased the values of c for the Japanese automakers’ US-market models through differ-
ent channels. First, with the stable consumer demand and regulatory requirement for fuel 
economy in the US (as seen in Sect. 4.3), technological progress ( ΔG ) may have resulted 
in a reduction in c for their US-market models as well as (or instead of) an improvement 
in e (assuming other attributes are constant). If this is the case, ?̂?t (the estimate of 훼t ) 
obtained from Eq.  (3) would underestimate the effect of induced technological change 
due to the Japanese regulations, providing another reason to interpret ?̂?t as a lower bound 
of the actual effect.
Second, if the tightened Japanese regulations increased the fuel economy cost (c) for the 
Japanese firms’ Japanese-market models, these increases might have been incidentally trans-
mitted to their US-market models. This might be the case, for example, if similar models were 
sold across different markets with little adjustment in their specifications. In the framework of 
Eq. (3), this leads to an overestimation of the magnitude of induced technological change. The 
following results, however, indicate that such increases in c were negligible for the Japanese 
firms’ US-market fleet.
Using the US fuel economy test data (as described in Sect. 4.1) for the vehicles manu-
factured by the Japanese firms in the treatment group (Honda, Isuzu, Mazda, Mitsubishi, 
Nissan, Subaru, Suzuki, and Toyota) and sold in the US new vehicle market in 2004, I 
estimate
where vehicle configuration i is from manufacturer m and the other variables are as defined 
previously for Eq.  (3). The variable of interest here is the indicator variable Dim , which 
equals one if configuration i’s engine size was also available in its manufacturer m’s new 
vehicle fleet in Japan for the same year 2004, and zero otherwise.9 Thus, Dim is a proxy for 
the similarity of i’s characteristics to those of m’s Japanese-market configurations.
If the increases in the fuel economy cost (c), particularly those in the engine cost, for an 
automaker’s Japanese-market models were transmitted to the same producer’s US-market 
models and improved their fuel economy, I would obtain a positive estimate of 훽 in Eq. (5). 
This is because configuration i with Dim = 1 is more susceptible to this effect than configu-
ration j with Djm = 0 due to i’s relative similarity to firm m’s Japanese-market fleet. In col-
umn [1] of Table 1, 훽 is estimated to be insignificant (both statistically and in magnitude), 
implying that the Japanese regulations had only negligible effects on the fuel economy cost 
(c) of the Japanese vehicles offered in the US market.
Column [2] of Table 1 considers an additional condition for Dim : it equals one if (and 
only if) vehicle configuration i’s engine size was also available in m’s new vehicle fleet 
in Japan for 2004 (as in column [1]), and configuration i was manufactured in Japan (and 
exported to the US). Historically, few vehicle models manufactured by Japanese automak-
ers outside of Japan have been commercially exported to the Japanese market, except 
for a small number of captive import models for which Japan is not a primary market. 
Therefore, these vehicles would be less affected by the Japanese regulations. The defini-
tion of Dim in column [2] takes this aspect into account: the vehicles that are most sus-
ceptible to the incidental increases in c would be those similar to Japanese-market models 
and manufactured in Japan. In column [2], the estimate of 훽 is slightly negative and again 
(5)ln eim = 훽Dim + 휸�퐱im + 훿m + 휀im,
9 For the years prior to 2004, this analysis is infeasible due to the lack of detailed data at the vehicle con-
figuration level for the Japanese market.
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not statistically different from zero, thus confirming the implication of column [1] that the 
effects of the Japanese regulations are very limited on the fuel economy cost (c) of the 
Japanese automakers’ US-market models.
4.5  Non‑Japanese Automakers as a Control Group
I construct a control group from vehicles produced by selected American and European 
automakers (GM, Ford, Chrysler, BMW, Mercedes, Porsche, and Volvo) and sold in the 
US. These vehicles serve as a good control group for the following reasons. First, these 
firms’ PPFs were unlikely to be affected by the Japanese fuel economy regulations. Their 
sales in the Japanese market have been very small relative to those in other markets. For 
example, in 2001, GM sold only 21,000 vehicles in Japan (all imported), compared to 
4,888,000 vehicles in the US. The other automakers follow similar patterns. It is improb-
able that their PPFs were affected by the regulations in a market that accounted for only a 
tiny fraction of their total sales. In addition, between the mid-1980s and the early 2000s, 
world oil prices were relatively stable and tighter fuel economy regulations were not 
imposed in the US and the EU (as described in Sect.  4.3). Thus, these non-Japanese 
firms very likely experienced little, if any, induced innovation in fuel efficiency during 
this period.
There may possibly be spillover effects among automakers regarding fuel efficiency 
technologies. If this is the case, innovations by Japanese automakers would have incidental, 
positive effects on the technology levels of non-Japanese automakers. For this reason (as 
well as those mentioned above in Sect. 4.4), an estimate of induced technological progress 
from this framework shall be considered a lower bound of the actual effect.
The non-Japanese automakers in the control group are selected as follows. First, I 
pick nine non-Japanese firms who constantly participated in the US market between 
1985 and 2004 by introducing new configurations in most (i.e., more than 17) of the 
years in the period (all the Japanese firms in the treatment group satisfy this condi-
tion). Then, I exclude two firms (Volkswagen and Hyundai) that were likely to be 
technologically very different from the Japanese firms during the pre-treatment period 
Table 1  Does the similarity to 
Japanese market models affect 
fuel economy?
This table reports the estimate of 훽 of Eq. (5) for two different defini-
tions of the indicator variable Dim (shown in the left column). Cluster-
robust standard errors are in parentheses, where the data are clustered 
by manufacturer, m
*p < 0.1 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01
[1] [2]
ퟏ(Engine size available in Japan) 0.004
(0.020)
ퟏ(Engine size available in Japan) × ퟏ(Made in Japan) − 0.001
(0.009)
R2 0.946 0.947
No. of obs. 371 371
799Environmental Policy and Induced Technological Change: Evidence…
1 3
Table 2  Summary statistics 
(mean and standard deviation)
The treatment group consists of eight Japanese automakers: Honda, 
Isuzu, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Subaru, Suzuki, and Toyota. The 
control group consists of seven American and European automakers: 
Chrysler, Ford, GM, BMW, Mercedes, Porsche, and Volvo
Group Treatment 
( N = 5353)
Control 
( N = 6223)
Mean SD Mean SD
Fuel economy (mpg) 26.9 5.5 25.4 4.7
Engine displacement (cid) 158 50 185 54
Weight (lb) 3565 696 3728 699
Horsepower (hp) 162 64 166 60
Light-duty truck 0.38 0.49 0.44 0.50
Manual transmission 0.41 0.49 0.38 0.49
Semi-auto transmission 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.15
Automatic transmission 0.55 0.50 0.59 0.49
FWD 0.45 0.50 0.40 0.49
RWD 0.24 0.43 0.40 0.49
AWD/4WD 0.32 0.47 0.21 0.40
Fig. 7  Relative fuel economy (Japanese relative to non-Japanese vehicles) conditional on other attributes. 
Note: The estimate of 훼
t
 of Eq. (3) is plotted for each year. The average of 훼
t
 over 1985–1993 is normalized 
to zero
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Table 3  Estimation of the production possibility frontier (1985–2004/2009)
This table reports the results of estimating Eq. (3): ln eimt = 훼tJmt + 휸�퐱imt + 훿m + 휂t + 휖imt . Cluster-robust 
standard errors are in parentheses, where the data are clustered by manufacturer, m
*p < 0.1 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
t  (i.e., time trend) 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001)
Japanese × t × ퟏ(t≤1993) − 0.001 0.000
(0.003) (0.003)
log(Weight) 3.096 3.024 3.072** 2.882** 3.988 2.968
(2.426) (2.419) (1.187) (1.120) (2.695) (2.225)
log(Horsepower) − 3.773*** − 3.747*** − 3.517*** − 3.465*** − 3.988*** − 3.101***
(0.568) (0.569) (0.478) (0.418) (0.618) (0.599)
log(Engine) − 0.021 − 0.006 0.542 0.581 − 0.855 0.107
(0.794) (0.785) (0.746) (0.752) (1.047) (1.229)
[
log(Weight)
]2 − 0.369* − 0.363* − 0.294*** − 0.280*** − 0.461** − 0.265
(0.187) (0.186) (0.094) (0.089) (0.200) (0.169)
[
log(Horsepower)
]2 − 0.037 − 0.036 0.013 0.013 − 0.019 0.051
(0.040) (0.040) (0.073) (0.072) (0.041) (0.079)
[
log(Engine)
]2 0.001 0.004 0.018 0.018 0.022 0.056
(0.057) (0.058) (0.123) (0.128) (0.063) (0.154)
log(Weight) × log(Horsepower) 0.500*** 0.499*** 0.391*** 0.386*** 0.525*** 0.304*
(0.089) (0.088) (0.106) (0.098) (0.103) (0.142)
log(Weight) × log(Engine) − 0.015 − 0.019 − 0.125 − 0.128 0.081 − 0.110
(0.126) (0.128) (0.149) (0.154) (0.166) (0.222)
log(Horsepower) × log(Engine) − 0.006 − 0.009 0.017 0.015 − 0.038 0.002
(0.068) (0.067) (0.131) (0.130) (0.058) (0.087)
Light-duty truck − 0.052*** − 0.052*** − 0.052*** − 0.052*** − 0.054*** − 0.057***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Manual transmission 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.039*** 0.036***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Semi-auto transmission 0.015 0.015 0.010 0.010 − 0.011 − 0.015
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
RWD − 0.038*** − 0.037*** − 0.035*** − 0.034*** − 0.036*** − 0.031***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007)
AWD/4WD − 0.066*** − 0.066*** − 0.070*** − 0.070*** − 0.066*** − 0.070***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.013)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Japanese × Year fixed effects Yes ’94–’09 Yes ’94–’09 Yes Yes
Smallest and largest included Yes Yes No No Yes No
Period ’85–’09 ’85–’09 ’85–’09 ’85–’09 ’85–’04 ’85–’04
R2 0.893 0.893 0.858 0.858 0.890 0.854
No. of obs. 11576 11576 7945 7945 9647 6584
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(1985–1993).10 This leaves seven American and European automakers (GM, Ford, 
Chrysler, BMW, Mercedes, Porsche, and Volvo).
To enhance the comparability of the treatment and control groups, the sample used in 
the following analysis excludes those vehicles in the treatment (control) group in year t that 
weigh more than the maximum weight or less than the minimum weight of the vehicles in 
the control (treatment, respectively) group in the same year. The same process is repeated 
with engine displacement and horsepower sequentially replacing weight, thereby remov-
ing those observations that do not have comparable configurations in the other group. 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics (mean and standard deviation) for the sample thus 
constructed, which is used in the baseline estimation of Eq. (3) for MYs 1985–2009 (to be 
reported in Table 3 and Fig. 7 below).
5  Estimation Results
5.1  Analysis of the Overall Trend (1985–2009)
First, I estimate Eq.  (3) and graphically analyze the overall trend of induced innovation 
in fuel efficiency without assuming a specific treatment period. I want to confirm that in 
the pre-treatment period (1985–1993), the Japanese and non-Japanese firms have similar 
trends with respect to fuel efficiency, conditional on other vehicle attributes. I also want 
to see whether the relative fuel efficiency of the treatment group responds to the increased 
regulatory pressure in Japan after the mid-1990s.
The coefficients of primary interest are 훼t’s. The average of 훼t ’s for 1985–1993 is nor-
malized to zero, so that 훼t can be interpreted as follows. Suppose that two hypothetical 
vehicle models (model 1 from Japanese automaker A and model 2 from non-Japanese 
automaker B) with the same non-fuel-economy attributes ( 퐱 ) are produced on the PPF of 
the respective firms each year (so that the error term 휀imt = 0 ). Then, 
ln e1At − ln e2Bt = 훼t + 훿A − 훿B , which is approximately the relative difference in fuel econ-
omy (mpg) between models 1 and 2 in year t ( = e1At−e2Bt
e2Bt
 ). As ∑1993
s=1985
훼s = 0 by construc-
tion, 훼t is approximately equal to 
e1At
e2Bt
−
1
9
∑1993
s=1985
e1As
e2Bs
 , or the change in relative fuel econ-
omy ( e1At
e2Bt
 ) from the pre-treatment period average.
Based on the estimation of Eq. (3), Fig. 7 plots ?̂?t (the estimate of 훼t ) for the period of 
1985–2009, with standard errors clustered at the manufacturer (m) level. Figure 7 shows 
that ?̂?t is stable until the mid-1990s, suggesting that the Japanese and non-Japanese firms 
have comparable pre-treatment trends in fuel economy, conditional on 퐱imt and 훿m . The esti-
mates of 휸 , though not of primary interest here, are reported in column [1] of Table 3.
Column [2] of Table  3 also confirms this point. In column [2], the variable 
Jm × t × ퟏ(t≤1993) (i.e., Japanese × t × ퟏ(t≤1993) in the table) replaces column [1]’s Jmt (i.e., 
Japanese × Year fixed effects in the table) for the pre-treatment period ( 1985 ≤ t ≤ 1993 ), 
10 More specifically, using the MYs 1985–1993 vehicles from the Japanese firms in the treatment group 
and the nine non-Japanese firms, I estimate
I compare the estimated manufacturer fixed effects, and include a non-Japanese firm in the control group 
unless its fuel efficiency conditional on 퐱imt and year fixed effects is significantly different (at the 5% level) 
from every Japanese firm’s.
(6)ln eimt = 휸�퐱imt + 훿m + 휂t + 휀im.
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thus parametrically measuring the time trend applicable only to the pre-treatment Japa-
nese vehicles. The (economically and statistically) insignificant coefficient estimate 
(−  0.001) for this variable, Jm × t × ퟏ(t≤1993) , indicates that conditional on 퐱imt and 훿m , 
both groups exhibit very similar time trends in fuel economy during 1985–1993, which 
are captured by year fixed effects ( 휂t).
Figure  8 and column [3] (or [4]) check the robustness of this finding by repeating 
the estimation of Eq. (3) with dropping the smallest and largest vehicles in the original 
Fig. 8  Relative fuel economy (Japanese relative to non-Japanese vehicles) conditional on other attributes, 
with the smallest and largest vehicles excluded from the sample. Note: The estimate of 훼
t
 of Eq. (3) is plot-
ted for each year. The average of 훼
t
 over 1985–1993 is normalized to zero
Fig. 9  Relative fuel economy (Japanese relative to non-Japanese vehicles) conditional on other attributes, 
with the largest vehicles excluded from the sample. Note: The estimate of 훼
t
 of Eq. (3) is plotted for each 
year. The average of 훼
t
 over 1985–1993 is normalized to zero
803Environmental Policy and Induced Technological Change: Evidence…
1 3
sample, potential outliers that may be driving the above results.11 This truncated sample 
gives much the same results as the original sample (Fig. 7 and columns [1] and [2]).
With these results, both the Japanese and non-Japanese vehicles (manufacturers) are 
reasonably assumed to have followed a common time trend during 1985–1993 with respect 
to the effect of ΔG and Δc on fuel economy. Then, as argued in Sect. 4.3, had it not been 
for the tightening of the Japanese fuel economy targets, both groups would have continued 
to have a common trend even after the pre-treatment period. The non-Japanese vehicles 
then serve as a good control group, and the trend in 훼t after the mid-1990s can be attributed 
to the tightened Japanese regulations.
Figures  7 and  8 both exhibit a trend change around 1996–1997, and since then, ?̂?t 
mostly remains much higher than before.12 This is consistent with Fig.  3, which shows 
a rapid fuel economy improvement in the Japanese market (conditional on weight class) 
starting around 1995–1997. The trend change in Figs. 7 and 8 thus signifies the impact of 
the tightened Japanese regulations as observed in the Japanese vehicles in the US market. 
Furthermore, with the results in Table 1, which suggest only negligible effects of the Japa-
nese regulations on the fuel economy cost (c) of the US-market models, the upward shift in 
Figs. 7 and 8 after the second half of the 1990s is interpreted as the technological progress 
( ΔG ) induced by the Japanese regulations.
Interestingly, Fig.  7 also displays a sharp decline in the final few years (and so does 
Fig. 8 to a lesser extent). This results from substantial improvements in fuel economy (con-
ditional on 퐱imt and 훿m ) in the late 2000s achieved by the non-Japanese firms. In particular, 
improvements in their small cars matter as shown in Fig.  9, which excludes the largest 
vehicles from the original sample (as in Fig. 8) but not the smallest ones and thus reflects 
improvements in the latter. As discussed above, these firms had been under little pressure 
to improve fuel economy from the mid-1980s until the oil (fuel) price hikes (which led to 
stronger consumer demand for fuel economy) and the gradual tightening of the US or EU 
fuel economy standards in the mid-2000s. Facing the changes in the mid-2000s, these man-
ufacturers presumably became more focused on the fuel economy of their vehicles, espe-
cially of their small cars that can naturally achieve better mpg ratings than large vehicles. 
It appears that their effort began to materialize as substantial fuel economy improvements 
(conditional on 퐱imt and 훿m ) in the late 2000s. On the other hand, it is likely that the Japa-
nese firms, which had already been under regulatory pressure for fuel economy improve-
ment in their home market (Japan), were less affected by the oil price hikes or the tightened 
US or EU regulations. Thus, the decline in the final years of Figs. 7, 8 and 9 is consistent 
with my identification strategy that only Japanese automakers went through induced inno-
vations in fuel efficiency from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s.
Finally, columns [5] and [6] of Table 3 present the estimation results for 1985–2004, 
with year fixed effects replaced by a linear time trend. Note that this period precedes the 
oil price hikes and tighter US and EU fuel economy regulations, so that the non-Japanese 
automakers in the control group were under little pressure to achieve better fuel economy. 
12 In both figures (as well as in Fig. 9 below), the years 2000 and 2001 show relatively low estimates for 
the period after the late 1990s. This could be explained by, for example, spillover effects from Japanese to 
non-Japanese automakers, or just random shocks due to different vehicle model cycles across the automak-
ers. With the limited information available, it is difficult to further explore this point.
11 Relatively speaking, the distribution of vehicles in the treatment (control) group is skewed toward small 
(large) vehicles. I thus remove the lightest 10% and the heaviest 10% of the year t vehicles in the original 
sample of columns [1] and [2]. The same procedure is repeated sequentially for horsepower and engine size.
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The time trend captures the effects of factors such as autonomous technological progress 
and temporal changes in c. As discussed above, both the Japanese and non-Japanese firms 
are reasonably assumed to have followed a common trend with respect to these factors. 
This common, autonomous rate of fuel economy improvement (conditional on other 
explanatory variables) is estimated at 0.7% annually.
5.2  Direct Comparison of the Pre‑treatment and Treatment Periods
Based on the findings from Figs. 7, 8 and 9, I now consider a specific treatment period, 
and directly compare it with the pre-treatment period. Using the vehicle specification data 
for the pre-treatment period MYs 1985–1993 and the treatment period MYs T0–T1 (to be 
defined below), I estimate
where Jm ⋅ ퟏ(T0≤t≤T1) is a dummy variable that equals one for the Japanese vehicles dur-
ing MYs T0–T1 when the regulatory pressure from the fuel economy regulations in Japan 
affected its automakers. This period is compared with MYs 1985–1993.13 The coefficient 
of interest is 훼 , which measures the change in fuel economy that is specific to the Japanese 
vehicles in the treatment period, conditional on other vehicle attributes 퐱imt and manufac-
turer and year fixed effects. As discussed previously, α is interpreted as a lower bound of 
the effect of technological progress induced by the Japanese regulations.
Regarding the treatment period, vehicle model cycles, as discussed before, caused 
the impact of induced innovation to appear in the second half of the 1990s, prior to the 
enforcement year of 2000 (Figs. 7, 8, 9), making it difficult to clearly determine the begin-
ning of the treatment period ( T0 ). Thus, I report the results for different values of T0 (1995, 
1996, 1997, and 1998).
I also consider different choices for the end of the treatment period ( T1 ). First, I set a 
shorter treatment period with T1 = 2000 or 2001, assuming that the Japanese producers 
had been under regulatory pressure (at least) until the target enforcement year of 2000.14 
Columns [1], [2], [4], and [5] of Table 4 report ?̂? (the estimate of 훼 ) for different treatment 
periods ending in either MY 2000 or 2001. Columns [1] and [2] are based on the sample 
with the smallest and largest vehicles included (sample 1), as in columns [1], [2], and [5] 
of Table 3, while columns [4] and [5] use the sample excluding those vehicles (sample 2), 
as in columns [3], [4], and [6] of Table 3. The regression results demonstrate a sizeable 
effect of induced technological progress. In most cases, ?̂? is approximately 0.03–0.05 and 
is statistically significant. Sample 2 gives higher estimates than sample 1 (though not statis-
tically significantly). The estimates indicate that the Japanese regulations induced at least 
a 3–5% improvement in the PPF for fuel efficiency, aside from autonomous technological 
change. Compared with the autonomous improvement rate of 0.7% per annum (columns 
[5] and [6] of Table 3), the estimated effect of this induced innovation is at least as large 
as the improvement that would have occurred over 4–7 years with no pressure from fuel 
prices or fuel economy regulations.
(7)ln eimt = 훼Jm ⋅ ퟏ(T0≤t≤T1) + 휸
�
퐱imt + 훿m + 휂t + 휀imt,
13 Figures 3 and 7 indicate little to no sign of induced innovation until around 1995. Setting the end of the 
pre-treatment period to 1994 or 1995 yields essentially the same results as below.
14 The target enforcement year here refers to April 2000–March 2001, Japan’s fiscal year 2000. Thus, I con-
sider the MY 2001 vehicles in the US, which came onto the market in late (calendar year) 2000, as well as 
the MY 2000 vehicles.
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Second, T1 is set at MY 2004. This means that the 2010 Japanese targets (set in 1999 to 
be enforced in 2010) kept the Japanese automakers under regulatory pressure even after 
2000. Indeed, they reacted to the 2010 targets quickly, and the average new vehicle in each 
weight class met the corresponding target by 2005 at the latest, implying that the 2000 and 
2010 regulations continuously pressured automakers to improve fuel economy both before 
and after 2000. As described above, fuel (oil) prices were relatively stable until the end 
of 2003 (Figs. 4 and 5), and the US CAFE standards began to be gradually tightened only 
after MY 2005 (Fig. 6). Thus, the effect of induced innovation can be reasonably assumed 
to have been negligible for the non-Japanese vehicles until MY 2004,15 while it may have 
substantially increased after MY 2005 (especially in the late 2000s, as implied by Figs. 7, 8 
and 9. Under these circumstances, MY 2004 is selected as the end of the treatment period 
during which only the Japanese manufacturers were subject to induced technological pro-
gress. Columns [3] and [6] of Table 4 show ?̂? for different treatment periods ending in MY 
2004: on the whole, ?̂? is approximately 0.03–0.04 and is statistically significant, which is 
essentially in line with the above result with T1 = 2000 or 2001.
Tables  5 and  6 also compare the two groups of vehicles based on the estimation of 
Eq. (7), but they distinguish the Japanese vehicles by the location of production. That is, 
by interacting Jm ⋅ ퟏ(T0≤t≤T1) with production location dummy variables, I estimate 훼 ’s sepa-
rately in one regression for the Japanese vehicles produced in different locations. Tables 5 
and 6 present 훼 ’s separately for the Japanese vehicle configurations manufactured only in 
Japan and exported to the US (“JP” columns) and those manufactured only in North Amer-
ica (Canada, the US, and Mexico) and sold there (“NA” columns). Table 5 (Table 6) uses 
sample 1 (sample 2) that includes (excludes) the smallest and largest vehicles. The tables 
show that the effect of induced innovation is much the same in magnitude across the two 
Table 4  Estimated lower 
bounds of the effect of induced 
technological progress
For different treatment periods and samples, this table reports the esti-
mate of 훼 of Eq. (7): ln eimt = 훼Jm ⋅ ퟏ(T0≤t≤T1) + 휸
�
퐱imt + 훿m + 휂t + 휖imt . 
The smallest and largest vehicles are included (excluded) in sample 1 
(sample 2). Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses, where 
the data are clustered by manufacturer, m
*p < 0.1 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01
Sample Sample 1 Sample 2
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
To 2000 2001 2004 2000 2001 2004
From
1995 0.023 0.021 0.023* 0.035* 0.033* 0.033*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
1996 0.031* 0.028* 0.029* 0.041** 0.038* 0.037*
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019)
1997 0.040** 0.033* 0.032** 0.055** 0.048* 0.043*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.022) (0.024) (0.021)
1998 0.039** 0.029* 0.030** 0.052** 0.044* 0.038*
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.019) (0.022) (0.019)
15 MY 2004 vehicles typically came onto the market in late (calendar year) 2003.
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production locations. This finding is in line with Table 1 in Sect. 4.4, which also reports 
that the effect of production locations on fuel economy, conditional on other explanatory 
variables, is very limited.
Finally, in Table  7, I estimate Eq.  (7) with sample 1 again, as in columns [1]–[3] of 
Table  4, but this time with swapping the roles of fuel economy ( eimt ) and any of the 
three (non-binary) variables of 퐱imt (weight, horsepower, and engine displacement) in the 
original version of Eq.  (7). For example, (the log of) engine displacement serves as the 
dependent variable, while (the log of) fuel economy enters the right-hand side along with 
its square and interactions with (the log of) weight and horsepower. The rationale for the 
swap is that an outward shift of the PPF due to technological progress (as in Fig.  1) is 
not only regarded as a better fuel economy conditional on other attributes, as originally 
examined by Eq. (7), but also as, for example, a larger engine displacement conditional on 
other attributes (including fuel economy). The latter view places weight, horsepower, or 
engine displacement on the left-hand side of Eq. (7), and fuel economy on the right-hand 
side. Note, however, that fuel economy is the natural choice for the dependent variable 
and thus the original specification with fuel economy on the left-hand side is more pre-
ferred. This is because the fuel economy tests under the CAFE standards, the source of 
my dataset, measure and determine the fuel economy of a vehicle that is equipped with a 
fixed set of (non-fuel-economy) attributes by driving it on a dynamometer, and each test is 
subject to random noise that is included in the measured fuel economy. Table 7 reports ?̂? 
for each dependent variable. The estimates are statistically significant (insignificant) and 
relatively large (small) when engine displacement (weight or horsepower) is the dependent 
Table 5  Estimated lower bounds 
by production location (sample 
1)
Using sample 1, this table reports the estimate of 훼 of Eq. 
(7) for different treatment periods and production locations: 
ln eimt =
∑
L훼LJm ⋅ ퟏ(T0≤t≤T1) ⋅ ퟏ(limt=L) + 휸
�
퐱imt + 훿m + 휂t + 휖imt , where 
limt represents vehicle configuration imt’s production location. The 
“JP” (“NA”) columns show ?̂?L for L = “Japan only” (“North America 
only”), i.e., Japanese vehicle configurations in the US market that are 
manufactured only in Japan (North America). Cluster-robust standard 
errors are in parentheses, where the data are clustered by manufac-
turer, m
*p < 0.1 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01
To 2000 2001 2004
Made in JP NA JP NA JP NA
From
1995 0.016 0.020 0.015 0.017 0.018* 0.019
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.010) (0.015)
1996 0.024 0.028* 0.022 0.023 0.024** 0.024
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.011) (0.016)
1997 0.037** 0.037** 0.032* 0.028 0.031** 0.028
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.012) (0.017)
1998 0.040** 0.035** 0.032* 0.024 0.031** 0.025
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.011) (0.017)
807Environmental Policy and Induced Technological Change: Evidence…
1 3
variable.16 This implies that the technological progress induced by the Japanese regula-
tions mainly helped enhance either the fuel economy or engine displacement of Japanese 
vehicles in the US market. The large estimates observed when engine displacement is the 
dependent variable may be because the Japanese vehicles in the dataset tended to carry 
smaller engines than the American and European vehicles, as suggested in Table 2, making 
a quick catch-up relatively easy.
Table 6  Estimated lower bounds 
by production location (sample 
2)
This table reports the results of using sample 2 to estimate the same 
model as in Table 5
*p < 0.1 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01
To 2000 2001 2004
Made in JP NA JP NA JP NA
From
1995 0.028* 0.033** 0.027 0.032* 0.027* 0.031*
(0.016) (0.014) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017)
1996 0.033* 0.039** 0.032 0.036* 0.031* 0.034*
(0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.019)
1997 0.050** 0.053** 0.044* 0.046* 0.039* 0.041*
(0.022) (0.020) (0.024) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021)
1998 0.053** 0.050** 0.043* 0.041* 0.037* 0.036
(0.021) (0.019) (0.024) (0.023) (0.018) (0.021)
Table 7  Other attributes as the dependent variable
This table estimates Eq. (7) as in columns [1]–[3] of Table 4 after swapping the roles of fuel economy and 
any of the three vehicle attributes (weight, horsepower, and engine displacement) in the original version of 
Eq. (7). Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses, where the data are clustered by manufacturer, m
*p < 0.1 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01
Dep. var. ln(Weight) ln(Horsepower) ln(Engine)
To 2000 2001 2004 2000 2001 2004 2000 2001 2004
From
1995 − 0.004 − 0.003 − 0.005 − 0.007 − 0.009 − 0.016 0.050** 0.048** 0.064***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.034) (0.030) (0.030) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018)
1996 0.001 0.001 − 0.003 − 0.012 − 0.014 − 0.022 0.057** 0.054** 0.072***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.037) (0.032) (0.032) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018)
1997 0.003 0.002 − 0.003 − 0.006 − 0.009 − 0.020 0.073*** 0.066*** 0.084***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.043) (0.036) (0.034) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017)
1998 0.008 0.005 − 0.002 − 0.008 − 0.012 − 0.022 0.072*** 0.063*** 0.084***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.045) (0.036) (0.034) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018)
16 Using sample 2 and/or additionally considering production locations in the same way as in Tables  5 
and 6 leads to very similar findings as in Table 7.
808 T. Kiso 
1 3
6  Conclusion
Given the importance of environmental and energy-efficient technologies for lowering 
the long-term costs of environmental protection, understanding how environmental poli-
cies affect the progress in these technologies is key to effectively designing these poli-
cies. I have examined this issue in the context of automobile fuel economy, an important 
determinant of global carbon emissions, by focusing on the past experiences of Japanese 
automakers. Fuel economy regulations in Japan started to be tightened in the 1990s. I 
have analyzed whether the tightened regulations induced technological progress by 
looking at changes in the characteristics of vehicles produced by Japanese automakers 
between the 1980s and the 2000s.
In the previous literature, induced innovation in environmental or energy-efficient 
technologies has been typically measured by changes in relevant patent activities over 
time. This paper, on the other hand, estimates it by analyzing temporal changes in vehicle 
characteristics (e.g., fuel economy, weight, and horsepower) that were actually offered 
in the market. Thus, I aim to fill the gap in the literature between invention (patents) and 
commercialization (marketed products’ characteristics).
The empirical strategy of the paper is to exploit the international differences in fuel 
economy regulations and the variation across automakers in the relative importance of 
different national markets in their sales, as in Popp (2006) and Aghion et  al. (2016). 
Japan tightened its fuel economy regulations in the 1990s, preceding other regions such 
as the US and the EU. Moreover, the Japanese market has accounted for only a small 
fraction of the total sales of each non-Japanese automaker considered. Under these 
circumstances, I apply a difference-in-differences regression framework to a vehicle 
specification dataset from the US market and compare Japanese vehicles with selected 
American and European vehicles. Focusing on the US market rather than the Japanese 
market makes it possible to observe the effect of induced technological change without 
being confounded by the production cost increases that the tightened regulations pre-
sumably caused for the Japanese-market models. In addition, the comparison with the 
control group (the US-market fleet of selected American and European automakers that 
were unlikely to be affected by the Japanese regulations) “differences out” the factors 
that are common to both the treatment and control groups, such as autonomous techno-
logical change.
The regression analyses reveal sizeable technological progress that was induced by 
the tightened Japanese fuel economy standards. The estimated lower bounds of the 
effect mostly range from 3 to 5%. That is, the regulation-induced technological progress 
in fuel efficiency improved the average Japanese vehicle’s fuel economy by at least 
3–5% relative to a counterfactual case of no regulatory change, holding constant other 
vehicle attributes and the production cost devoted to fuel economy. These lower bounds 
are roughly equivalent to the fuel economy improvement (conditional on other vehicle 
attributes) that would have occurred over 4–7  years even with no pressure from fuel 
economy regulations or fuel prices. These findings serve to illustrate that induced inno-
vations that the previous studies have confirmed in patent data are indeed adopted in 
commercialized products and significantly improve actual environmental performance 
or energy efficiency.
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